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ABSTRACT 
Catastrophic risks are rare events with major consequences, such as market crashes, 
catastrophic climate change, asteroids or the extinction of a species. We show that classic 
expected utility theory based on Von Neumann axioms is insensitive to rare events no matter 
how catastrophic. Its insensitivity emerges from a requirement of continuity (e.g. Arrow's 
Monotone Continuity Axiom, and its relatives as defined by De Groot, Hernstein and Milnor) that 
anticipate average responses to extreme events. This leads to countably additive measures and 
`expected utility' that are insensitive to extreme risks. In a new axiomatic extension, the author 
(Chichilnisky 1996, 2000, 2002) requires equal treatment of rare and frequent events, deriving 
the new decision criterion the axioms imply. 
These are expected utility combined with purely finitely additive measures that focus on 
catastrophes, and explain the presistent observations of distributions with "fat tails" in earth 
sciences and financial markets. Continuity is based on the `topology of fear' introduced in 
Chichilnisky (2009), and is linked to Debreu's 1953 work on Adam Smith's Invisible Hand. The 
balance between the classic and the new axioms tests the limits of non- parametric estimation in 
Hilbert spaces, Chichilnisky (2008).. extending the foundations of probability & statistics 
(Chichilnisky 2009 and 2010) to include "black swans" or rare events, and finite as well as 
infinite state spaces. 
Keywords: catastrophic risks, choice under uncertainty, black swans, green economics, 
incompleteness of mathematics, axiom of choice 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article is an investigation on the way that economics deals with catastrophic risks such as market 
crashes, catastrophic climate change and the extinction of a species. Catastrophic risks are rare 
events with major consequences. They include the 2008-9 global financial crisis that is a one-in-a-
hundred-years event with momentous consequences for global markets, and more generally any rare 
event that threatens human survival - such as a large asteroid impact (Posner, 2004; United Nations, 
2000; Chichilnisky and Eisenberger, 2010). The article shows how to rewrite the foundations of 
probability and statistics - the way we observe the universe around us -- so as to systematically 
incorporate outliers" and "fat tails" in our formal discourse, and how to develop a decision theory 
that agrees with the recent neurological experiments on how the human brain reacts to fear - 
both of which are denied in conventional Von Neumann Morgenstern theory of decision under 
uncertainty.  
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more on this below. The practical importance of the classic theory is underscored by the fact that US 
Congress requires its use in cost benefit analysis of any major budgetary decision. Decisions based 
on "expected utility" have been elevated to the status of "rational decisions," and rational behavior 
under uncertainty has became identified with optimizing expected utility. Yet for almost as many 
years, experimental and empirical evidence has questioned the validity of the expected utility model. 
Well known examples of diverging experimental evidence include the Allais Paradox (Allais, 1988) 
This article summarizes how Von Neumann's classic theory of choice under uncertainty 
evaluates catastrophic risks, and identifies why it is insensitive to rare events. The classic theory was 
developed axiomatically by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Hernstein and Milnor, Villegas, Arrow, 
De Groot and others1. The point of this article is to show how the classic axioms evaluate 
catastrophic risks - to explain its insensitivity to rare events no matter how catastrophic they 
may be. Posner (2004); Tversky and Wakker (1995) and Chichilnisky (2000); (2007), leading 
therefore to a `disconnect' between decisions involving classic economic theory, and the way 
green economics and many human societies react to potential catastrophes such as global 
warming and widespread biodiversity extinction. Without throwing the baby with the bathtub 
water, the article explains a recent sharp generalization of the classic theory of decision making 
under uncertainty that requires equal treatment of frequent and rare events and is sensitive to 
catastrophic events, explicitly incorporating outliers and explaining the common observation of 
"heavy tails" as part of the standard statistical treatment, Chichilnisky (1977); (1996a); 
(1996b); (2002); (2006a); (2006b); (2009a); (2009b); (2010); Chichilnisky and Wu (2006), 
Chanel and Chichilnisky (2007). The recent treatment of catastrophic risks presented here is 
linked to the early work of Gerard Debreu (1954) on Adam Smith's invisible hand, the two welfare 
theorems of economics, and to the work of Kurt Godel (1940) on the Axiom of Choice and the 
"incompleteness" of mathematics. We also illustrate the connection between rare events and the 
foundation of statistic analysis in econometrics (Chichilnisky, 2006), and recent neuro-economic 
evidence of how humans choose when they face catastrophes and under conditions of fear 
(Chichilnisky, 1977; Le Doux, 1996;  Chanel and Chichilnisky, 2007). In recent work the 
foundations of probability and statistics are enlarged to includes "black swans" and the results are 
developed to include finite as well as infinite samples. 
CLASSIC AXIOMS OF CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Over half a century ago, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944); Hernstein and Milnor (1953), 
and Arrow (1963) introduced classic axioms to explain how we choose under conditions of 
uncertainty, see also Villegas (1964) and De Groot (2004) among others. The main consequence is 
to predict that we rank our choices under uncertainty (also called `lotteries') according to their 
`expected utility,' namely by optimizing a function defined on lotteries c(t)  by 
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and practical `puzzles' in finance such as the `Equity Premium Puzzle' and the `Risk Free 
Premium Puzzle' Mehra and Prescott (1985); (Mehra, 2003); Rietz (1988); Weil (1989) showing that 
the returns from equity and bonds are orders of magnitude different in practice from what expected 
utility analysis would predict. Early theoretical developments of this critical line of thought include 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Machina (1982); (1989); Tversky (1995); leading more recently an 
entire new field of decision analysis, Behavioral Economics, which questions rational behavior 
interpreted as expected utility optimization. 
This article focuses on one aspect of the classic theory that is shown to be critical to the 
disconnect between classic theory and experimental reality: how it deals with catastrophic risks 
and the issues that arise as well as the links that these issues have with econometrics, with the 
classic work on Adam Smith's invisible hand, with the foundation of statistics and non - 
parametric estimation, with Godel's fundamental theorems on the incompleteness of 
Mathematics, with the foundations of statistics and how it treats `outliers' and `heavy tails', as 
well as with the experimental  evidence of how we choose when we face rare events that inspire 
fear. 
In the following we summarize the motivation and provide the mathematical context. We then provide 
new axioms for decision under uncertainty that update the classic axioms in a way that coincides with 
Von Neumann's axioms in the absence of catastrophic events - therefore it represents a true 
extension of the existing theory. A representation theorem identifies new types of probability 
distributions that rank lotteries in situations involving catastrophic events; these combine expected 
utility (which averages risk) with extremal reactions to risk and are shown to arise from convex 
combinations of `countably additive' and `finitely additive' measures. An intuitive 'rule of thumb' of the 
new type of rankings is to optimize expected returns while minimizing losses in a catastrophe. This is 
a natural criterion of choice under uncertainty -- but it is shown to be inconsistent with expected utility. 
THE TOPOLOGY OF FEAR 
`Expected utility' analysis anticipates average responses to average risks, where the weights are the 
probability of the events. This seems fair enough. But it also anticipates average responses to 
extreme risks. The latter is more questionable. Through Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Le 
Doux (1996) has shown that humans often use a different part of the brain to deal with fear: we use 
the amygdala rather than the frontal cortex to make decisions on events that elicit fear. The 
amygdala is a primitive part of the brain that handles extreme emotions, and as such provides very 
simplified responses to risk. It causes extremal responses to extreme risks. When we feel fear, rather 
than averaging the evidence using probabilities, as we do with expected utility, we have extreme and 
simplified responses, for example a zero/one response such as "flight or fight".  This finding is the key 
to understanding how Von Neuman's (VN) theory underrepresents catastrophic risks, and to update 
the theory to represent more accurately how we behave when we face fear. The key can be found in 
the topology we use to evaluate `nearby events', the foundation of statistical measurements. The 
reason is simple. Topology is by definition the way we formalize the concept of "nearby." 
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Mathematically, the VN axioms postulate nearby responses to nearby events, a form of continuity that 
is necessary for empirical validation and robustness of the theory. But the specific topology used in 
the definition of continuity by Arrow (1963); Milnor and Hernstein (1953) and De Groot (1970); (2004) 
means that they anticipate that nearby is measured by averaging distances. Under conditions of fear, 
however, we measure distances differently, by extremals. Mathematically the difference is as follows: 
Average distance is defined by averaging coordinate by coordinate as in Euclidean space;3 in 
continuous function spaces on the real line (such as pL ( ),p  and Sobolev spaces) the average
distance is defined as 
pp
p
dtgfgf /1)|)(|(  
Extremal distances are measured instead by the supremum of the difference, namely by focusing on 
extremes,2 for example, using the sup norm of L : 
|)(|sup gfessgf
R


 
Changing the topology, namely the way we measure distances, changes our approach to risk: it leads 
to new ways to evaluate catastrophes. If we use a topology that takes extremals into consideration, 
our actions become more sensitive to extremal events no matter how rare they may be.  We call this 
the "topology of fear" (Chichilnisky, 2009) because it focuses sharply if not uniquely on the worst that 
can happen in the case of catastrophes. This is the approach followed in (Chichilnisky, 1977; 1996a; 
2000; 2002; 2006; 2009). The new axioms for choice under uncertainty introduced in this work agree 
with the classic theory when catastrophic events are absent, but otherwise they lead to a different 
type of statistics as well as econometrics, based on standard "gaussian" measures combined with 
singular measures (Chichilnisky, 2000), more on this below. 
MATHEMATICS OF RISK 
A few definitions are needed. A system is in one of several possible states which can be described by 
real numbers, the integers, a bounded segment of real numbers or a finite set of states 
}.,...{ 1 KssS   Here we choose the real line for simplicity. At the end of the article we address the 
case of finite states. To each state  s R   there is an associated outcome, so that one 
has ,)( NRsf  1	N . A description of probabilities across all states is called a lottery 
.:)( NRRsx 
  The space of all lotteries L  is therefore a function space .L  Under uncertainty 
one ranks lotteries in L . Von Neumann's (VN) axioms provided a mathematical formalization of how 
to rank lotteries. Optimization according to such a ranking is called `expected utility maximization' 
and defines decision making under uncertainty. To choose among risky outcomes, we rank lotteries. 
A lottery x  is ranked above another y  if and only if there is a real valued continuous function on 
International Journal of Ecological Economics & Statistics
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lotteries, ,W  that assigns to x  a larger real number than y : 
)()( yWxWyx   
EXPECTED UTILITY 
The main result from the VN axioms is a representation theorem that explains in practice how to 
choose under uncertainty: 
Theorem: (VN, Hernstein and Milnor, Villegas, De Groot, Arrow ) A ranking over lotteries which 
satisfies the VN axioms admits a representation by an integral operator ,: RLW 
  which has as a 
`kernel' a countably additive measure over the set of states, with an integrable density. This is called 
expected utility. 
The VN representation theorem proves that the ranking of lotteries is given by a function 
,: RLW 
  
)())(()( sdsxuxW
Rs
  
where the real line R  is the state space, NRRx 
:  is a lottery, 
 RRu N:  is a (bounded) 
utility function describing the utility provided by the (certain) outcome of the lottery in each state ,s  
)(xu , and where )(sd  is a standard countably additive measure over states s  in .R  The 
optimization of an expected utility W  is a widely used procedure for evaluating choices under 
uncertainty. Euler equations are used to characterize optimal solutions. 
WHAT ARE CATASTROPHIC RISKS? 
A catastrophic risk is a small probability - or rare - event which can lead to major and widespread 
losses. Classic methods do not work: it has been shown empirically and theoretically (Chichilnisky, 
1996a; 2000; 2009; Posner, 2004) that using VN expected utility criteria undervalues catastrophic 
risks and conflicts with the observed evidence of how humans evaluate such risks.  Mathematically 
the problem is that the measure   which emerges from the VN representation theorem presented 
above, is countably additive implying that any two lotteries Lyx ,  are ranked by W  quite 
independently of the utility of the outcome in states whose probabilities are lower than some threshold 
level 0  depending on x  and y.  This means that expected utility maximization is insensitive to
small probability events, no matter how catastrophic these may be. As shown in Chichilnisky (2000) 
the properties of the measure arise from continuity under an 1L  norm and when one changes this to 
continuity under a L  norm, the sup norm, one obtains in general different types of measure. 
Formally the problem with VN Axioms is the following 
International Journal of Ecological Economics & Statistics
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EXPECTED UTILITY IS INSENSITIVE TO RARE EVENTS 
A ranking W is called Insensitive to Rare Events when it ranks two choices focusing on 
their outcomes in frequent events, and neglects their outcomes are rare events. Formally, 
Definition 1: A ranking W is Insensitive to Rare Events when 
W (x) 
 W (y) 
  
 0,      (x, y) : 
W (x) 
W (y) 
for all x, y such that  
x  x and y   y a.e. except on A  R :   (A)    . 
In words, W ranks x above y if and only if it ranks x above y for any pair of lotteries x and y 
which are obtained by modifying arbitrarily x and y in sets of states A with probability lower 
than  . The interpretation of this property is that the ranking defined by W is insensitive to the 
outcomes of the lottery in rare events. Similarly, 
Definition 2: A ranking W is called Insensitive to Frequent Events when it ranks choices focusing 
exclusively on rare events, and neglects frequent events:  
W (x) 
 W (y) 
 M 
 0, M  M (x, y) : 
W (x) 
W (y) 
for all x, y such that
x and x y   y a.e. on A :R  ( )A  .
M 
Proposition 1: Expected utility is Insensitive to Rare Events. 
Proof : In Chichilnisky (2000) and (2009) 
As defined by VN, the expected utility criterion W is therefore less well suited for evaluating 
catastrophic risks. 
UPDATING VON NEUMANN MORGENSTERN AXIOMS 
A well-defined set of axioms introduced in (Chichilnisky, 1996a; 2000) update and extend 
Von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms by treating symmetrically rare and frequent risks. These axioms 
lead 
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other optimization criterion used so far. The space of lotteries is L  with the sup norm. 
NEW AXIOMS FOR CHOICES THAT INVOLVE CATASTROPHES 
Here are the new axioms about how to choose under uncertainty, how to "rank lotteries," when 
catastrophes are at stake: 
Axiom 1. The ranking RLW 
:   is sensitive to rare events. 
Axioms 2. The ranking W  is sensitive to frequent events 
Axiom 3:  The ranking W  is continuous and linear 
Axioms 2 and 3 are standard, they are satisfied for example by expected utility, and agree with VN 
axioms. But Axiom 1 negates Arrow's "Axiom of Monotone Continuity", which leads to Expected 
Utility. Indeed: 
Theorem 1: The Monotone Continuity Axiom (Hernstein & Milnor, 1953; Arrow, 1963; De Groot, 
1970) is equivalent to "Insensitivity to Rare Events". It is the logical negation of our Axiom 1. 
Proof: In Theorem 2, "The Topology of Fear" (Chichilnisky, 1977)  
Example: The Monotone Continuity Axioms of Arrow and Milnor provides A Statistical Value of Life 
(Chichilnisky, 1977). This defies the experimental evidence on how people value life (Chanel and 
Chichilnisky, 2007) 
A REPRESENTATION THEOREM 
As in the case of the prior VN axioms, the new axioms lead to a new representation theorem. 
Theorem 2 (Chichilnisky 1992, 1996, 2000) 
There exist criteria or functionals  RL 
 :  which satisfy all three new axioms. All such 
functionals are defined by a convex combination of purely and countably additive measures, 
with both parts present. 
Formally, there exists , ,10   a utility function RRxu 
:)(  and a countably additive regular 
measure   on R , represented by an  1L  density  , such that the ranking of lotteries  : L R 
   
is of the form  
)).((()1()()())(()( sxusdssxux   
where   denotes a purely finite measure on .R   
(1) 
to a new representation theorem and define new types of criteria or functions that are 
maximized under uncertainty. These functions are commonly used in practice but were not used in 
Economics, Mathematics or Statistics before. The result is quite different from expected utility 
maximization or any 
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The interpretation of (1) is straightforward. The first part of   is an integral operator with a countably 
additive kernel such as 1
2 Ls   emphasizing the weight of frequent events in the ranking of a lottery 
x L . This satisfies the second axiom Axiom 2, but not the first. The second purely finitely additive 
part assigns positive weight to rare events which have small probability according to ,  it satisfies 
Axiom 1 but not the second axiom. An example of a function of this nature is Long Run Averages 
when the catastrophic event is in the long run future. When both parts are present,   is sensitive to 
both rare and frequent events, it satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, both axioms are satisfied. Catastrophic 
risks are therefore ranked more realistically by such functionals. 
When there are no catastrophic events, the second axiom is void. Therefore the second component of 
   "collapses" to its first component, and we have 
Theorem 3: 
In the absence of catastrophic events, the choice function   agrees with the Expected Utility 
criterion for evaluating lotteries. Therefore, absent catastrophes, the new theory coincides 
with the old.  
Proof: 
In "The Topology of Fear", (Chichilnisky, 2009) 
FINITE STATES AND BLACK SWANS 
Some system are in one of a finite number of states, so the state space is  }.,...,{ 1 SssS   In this 
case one can develop a similar theory. One of the states could be identified as a "Black Swan", a rare 
event with momentuous consequences. Lotteries are now vectors in SR  representing the frequencies 
of the events. In such systems we define insensitivity to rare and frequent events as follows. A ranking 
of lotteries RRW S 
:  is called insensitive to rare events when Xgf  ,  
)()()()(:0 gWfWgWfW   when ff   and gg   except on events of 
measure smaller than .  Similarly we say that RRW S 
:  is insensitive to frequent events when 
Xgf  , )()()()(:0 gWfWgWfWN   when  ff   and gg   except on 
events of measure larger than .N   The axioms for finitely many states (state space R  or Z below are 
the new axioms: 
Axiom 1. The ranking RRW S 
:  is sensitive to rare events. 
Axioms 2. The ranking W  is sensitive to frequent events 
Axiom 3: The ranking W  is continuous and linear 
Theorem 4: Expected utility is insensitive to rare events with finitely many states. 
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Proof: For every gf ,  let Rgf ),(  satisfy }.,...,,,...,{ 11,...2,1 SSS ggffMin  
Then SRgf  , 0),(  gf  and it satisfies )()()()(: gWfWgWfW   when 
ff   and gg   except on events of measure smaller than   because there are no events of 
measure less than  . 
An alternative definition of insensitivity to rare events can be provided. For any two vectors 
KRfp ,  let  fp,  denote the inner product,  fp, = ..1 ss
K
s fp   If gf ,  are two lotteries in ,KR
and (.)W  is an expected utility, then we say that W  is insensitive to rare events if gf , :0  
)()()()( gWfWgWfW   
f   and g  satisfying  
   )( and )( 1111 ggff  
Under this second definition, expected utility is still insensitive to rare events. This can be seen as 
follows:  
  gxgWfxfWRxgWfW
S ,)(,)(:)()(
.)(:00)(
11
  

iii
S
i
iii
S
i
gfxgfx  
Now assume without loss of generality that min1 x ),...,( 1 Sxx , where state 1s  represents a 
`black swan', and   ,011  gf  then (2) and (3) are equivalent to  
2/|)]()[(| satisfying and  that so
 2/2/)()(
11111
111
1







gfgfxgf
gfxgfx iii
S
i
or, equivalently, f   and g  satisfying  
111111 2/)( and 2/)( xggxff  

).()()()( gWfWgWfW   
The reciprocal is immediate. 
Therefore we have shown that gf , :0  
(2) 
(3) 
11
f   and g  satisfying
111111 2/)( and 2/)( xggxff  

where  12/ x   and   satisfies (2) and (3). 
Theorem 5: With finitely many states, the choice function )()( ,...,1 sKs fMinfW   is insensitive to 
frequent events, and therefore violates axiom 2. It also fails to be linear, so it violates axiom 3. 
Proof: The insensitivity to frequent events is immediate from the definition. Linearity is clearly violated, 
for example, 
.1))0,1()1,0((000)0,1()1,0(  MinMinMin  
Theorem 6: With finitely many states, the function  )(,)( ss fMinfpfW   satisfies axioms 1 
and 2, but does not satisfy axiom 3. 
Proof: The proof that  W   satisfies axioms 1 and 2 is identical to the case of infinitely many states.
Theorem 5 showed that this function violates axiom 3. ?   
Generally speaking the standard averaging function that provide the expected value of a lottery is 
insensitive to rare events, while 'positional' choice functions, such as the max,min,  or median, are 
insensitive to frequent events. Combining the two gives a choice function that satisfies both axioms 1 
and 2, but linearity is lost. Intuitively, optimizing the function )(,)( ss fMinfpfW   corresponds 
to maximizing the expected value of the lottery f  according to a probability distribution denoted 
,KRp  plus minimizing the worse that can happen in case of a catastrophe. 
GERARD DEBREU AND ADAM SMITH'S INVISIBLE HAND 
Decisions involving catastrophic events, and the topology of fear that they induce, have deep 
mathematical roots. We show below that the decision rule involves a new type of statistics, based on 
a combination of regular measures (countably additive) as well as singular measures (finitely 
additive). In the most general cases, the construction of a singular measure is equivalent to the 
construction of Hahn Banach's separating hyperplanes and depends on the Axiom of Choice (Godel, 
1954; Chichilnisky, 2009). Thus extreme responses to risk conjure up the `Axiom of Choice' an axiom 
that K. Godel has proved is independent from the rest of Mathematics (Godel, 1954). This finding is 
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the so called "Godel's Incompleteness Theorem," and demonstrates a profound ambiguity that is part 
and parcel of Logics and Mathematics, no matter how rigorous they may be. This is a critical finding in 
the philosophy of science and has many important practical implications. 
There are also interesting implications for the foundations of statistics, or how we measure reality. The 
new types of probability distributions that emerge with catastrophic events are both regular and 
singular, exhibiting "heavy tails," and were never used before. However the "sup norm" topology of 
fear that is required to introduce sensitivity to rare events, is not new in economics. This topology was 
already used in 1953 by Gerard Debreu to prove Adam Smith's Invisible Hand Theorem (Debreu, 
1954). He used the function space L  with the sup norm - namely what the author has called "the 
topology of fear" (Chichilnisky, 2009) - to describe commodities, and to prove Adam Smith's Invisible 
Hand Theorem. This is the famous second welfare theorem of economics, which establishes that any 
optimal social distribution can emerge from a market equilibrium. The market reaches any optimal 
social solution, including the optimal allocation of risk bearing. Using Hahn Banach's theorem, Debreu 
found a separating hyperplane that represents the market prices and transforms any Pareto efficient 
allocation into a competitive equilibrium. This is what we now call Adam Smith's Invisible Hand. 
The critical point in all this is that Debreu's theorem is correct as stated -- but is not constructible 
since, as Godel has shown, the construction of the market prices depends on Hahn Banach's theorem 
and this in turn requires the Axiom of Choice that is independent from the rest of Mathematics 
(Chichilnisky, 1977; 2009). The logical and mathematical tools are rigorous and deep, but the full 
scope and practical implications for decision theory of Debreu's 1953 results have not been 
understood before. His 1953 welfare theorems are correct - markets can support any socially optimal 
solutions - but the market prices at stake may not be constructible. It may not be possible to design an 
algorithm to compute market prices that correspond to Adam's Smith's Invisible Hand. 
Similarly, we can decide on catastrophic events with criteria that treat rare and frequent events 
symmetrically, as in the new axioms required here. But the criteria may not always be constructible: in 
some cases the decisions may be ambiguous and we cannot `construct' an algorithm that decides on 
the solution. The constructability of the second (finitely additive) term of   is equivalent to the 
constructability of Hahn - Banach theorem, as used by G. Debreu in proving the second welfare 
theorem. An interesting historical observation is that Gerard Debreu published his original 1953 
(Debreu, 1954) results in the Proceedings of the US National Academy of Sciences -- yet his result 
contains the seed for expanding Von Neumann's theory of choice under uncertainty in a completely 
different direction that was meant by Von Neumann, as we saw above. In an interesting historical 
twist, Debreu's NAS publication shows in its header that the article was introduced to the National 
Academy by John Von Neumann himself. 
ARROW'S MONOTONE CONTINUITY AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 
The axiom that leads to the second term of  - namely the author's Axiom 1 of sensitivity to rare 
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Assumption 4SP  in De Groot (1970), which compares the relative likelihood of bounded and 
unbounded events. Furthermore, Assumption 4SP  is both Necessary and Sufficient for NP estimation 
in Hilbert Spaces on a unbounded sample space R  (Chichilnisky, 2009). 
EXAMPLES OF THE NEW CRITERIA OF CHOICE 
Example 1. Financial choices. In finance a typical example involves maximizing expected returns 
while minimizing the drop in a portfolio's value in case of a severe market downturn.   
Example 2. Network choices In terms of network optimization a well known criterion is to maximize 
expected electricity throughput in the grid, while minimizing the probability of a "black out." 
events - is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice in Mathematics and to the existence of Ultrafilters - 
and is therefore independent of the rest of the axioms in Mathematics, see Chichilnisky 
(2009). An example that comes to mind is in computing the "value of life" - and recent 
experimental results by Chanel and Chichilnisky (2007) show the deep ambiguity involving choice 
when death is a possible outcome. This point comes out clearly in the "Monotone Continuity 
Axiom" in Arrow (1963), who makes this point by means of the following sharp example and 
comments (see, Arrow, 1963): "If one prefers 10 cents to 1 cent, and 1 cent to death, then one 
should prefer 10 cents and a small probability of death, to 1 cent". This example comes 
directly from the definition of Monotone Continuity Definition in Arrow [arrow], who calls it, "at 
first sight, outreageous." Arrow also points out that the choice may be different if instead of 10 cents 
one would consider a large sum of money such as US$1 billion. This can be seen as an 
ambiguity in the choice that was denied in the classical theory but appears in the new axiomatic 
approach to choice under uncertainty presented above. We must learn to live with ambiguity. 
THE LIMITS OF ECONOMETRICS: NON PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION IN HILBERT SPACES 
At the frontiers of econometrics we find non-parametric estimation - namely econometric estimation 
in which we make no assumptions about functional forms. Therefore we work within a general 
function space - in this case a Hilbert space, which is the closest there is to euclidean space in 
continuous time and was first introduced in economics in 1977 (Chichilnisky, 1977). The limit 
of this NP estimation technology is reached when one tries to remove not just the constraint on 
functional form but also any a priori determination of a bound for the sample data, using as sample 
space the entire real line R.  In such cases, a new result identifies necessary and sufficient 
conditions for NP estimation, and curiously enough this relates to the same issues that 
underlies choices that are sensitive to rare events: 
Theorem: (Chichilnisky, 2009) Axiom 1 requiring Sensitivity to Rare Events is the logical negation of 
14
the corresponding continuity axiom in Hernstein Milnor (1953) and axiom 4SP  introduced in De Groot 
(1970). 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article summarizes the classic theory of choice under uncertainty introduced by Von Neumann 
and its insensitivity to rare events, even to those with major consequences such as environmental 
catastrophes. The cause is a continuity axiom that is essential in this theory, which averages risks and 
defines rationality in terms of averaging responses even when one is confronted with extreme risks. 
Through this bias against rare events our classic tools of analysis underestimate the importance of 
environmental catastrophes, an issue of concern for green economics. This helps explain the gap 
between standard economic thinking and green economics. New tools are required to properly 
account for environmental issues and more generally for situations involving rare events with major 
consequences. 
The article presented new axioms of choice under uncertainty introduced in Chichilnisky (1996a); 
(2000); (2002) that are consistent with Von Neumann's expected utility in the absence of rare events - 
but require equal treatment for frequent and rare events and as such are quite different from expected 
utility. The new axioms lead to criteria of choice that seem quite natural, yet inconsistent with 
expected utility analysis when rare events are at stake. For example, when choosing according to the 
new criteria of choice one optimizes expected utility moderated by a constraint on the worst outcomes 
in case of a catastrophe. The article showed how the new axioms rely on statistical foundations based 
on a notion of continuity that the author has called elsewhere "the topology of fear" (chichilnisky, 
2009) as it reproduces a type of behavior (extremal responses to extremal events) that neuro-
economics has observed in situations involving fear (Le Doux, 1996). The approach leads to new 
types of statistical distributions that are consistent with the persistent observation of "heavy tails" and 
"jump diffusion" processes, both of which are inconsistent with normal distributions, and offers a 
systematic approach to including `outliers' into the formal discourse. Finally we showed the 
connection between the new criteria of choice, the frontiers of econometrics in Non Parametric 
Estimation in Hilbert Spaces, Godel's work on the incompleteness of Mathematics and the classic 
Axioms of Choice. 
Both examples seem reasonable, and they agree with our three new Axioms for choice 
under uncertainty. However they contradict expected utility, the Monotone Continuity Axiom of Arrow 
(1963), 
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NOTES 
Dr. Chichilnisky is a Professor of Economics and Mathematical Statistics at Columbia University,
Director of Columbia Consortium for Risk Management (CCRM), the Sir Louis Matheson
Distinguished Professor at Monash University, Distinguished Visiting Professor at Nankai University
and at Beijing Normal University.
The results of this article were presented at Greqam Universite de Marseille, December 18th 2008, at 
LAMETA Universite de Montpellier, December 19th and 20th 2008, at the NBER-NSF General 
Equilibrium Conference in Honor of Gerard Debreu, October 6 2006, at the Statistics Department of 
Columbia University October 11 2006, at the Fields Institute for Mathematical Research Conference 
on Catastrohpic Risks, 1996, Toronto Canada, and at a Staff Seminar of NHH, University of Oslo 
Norway March 21 2007.
[1] The classic theory of choice under uncertainty that paralells the treatment of uncertainty in physics,
was created over half a century by Von Neumann and Morgentern (1944), see also Hernstein and
Milnor (1953), Arrow (1963), and is based on the statistical foundations of Villegas (1964) and De
Groot (1970).
[2] The two topologies are the same in finite dimensional space - whether using extremals or
averages - but they are radically different in continuous time models or with infinite horizons, which
are needed to explain "rare events"
[3] 2/1)(),( iii yxyxd 
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